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THE MOST DARING ACT OF THE AGE
Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, U.S. Navy
As the American military confronts the challenges of the twenty-first centurythere is a great deal of discussion of counterinsurgency, hybrid conflict, and
irregular warfare. In military history none of these concepts are new. Much of
the recent scholarship and writing on these forms of warfare has focused on to-
day’s operations ashore, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are
significant implications for naval warfare as well. The leaders of the sea services
stated in the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” that “preventing
wars is as important as winning wars.”1 If the U.S. Navy is going to embrace this
belief as it sails deeper into the twenty-first century, development of naval irreg-
ular warfare will become vital to its future success and relevance.
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that the best use of a navy is to find and
defeat an opponent’s fleet, but from the earliest history of the republic the U.S.
Navy has been involved in operations other than fleet-on-fleet engagements.2
These irregular operations, in the “green” (littoral) and “brown” (riverine) wa-
ters of the world, have been conducted on a global scale, no matter the size or
shape of the U.S. fleet. In 1839, during the Second
Seminole War, the “Mosquito Fleet,” under the com-
mand of Lieutenant John McLaughlin, conducted
joint counterinsurgency operations in the Everglades,
working with Army units.3 For almost half a century
shallow-draft American gunboats patrolled the rivers
of China, before being organized into the Yangtze Pa-
trol Force in 1921.4 In the 1960s and 1970s thousands
of sailors served in the Coastal Surveillance Force
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(Task Force 115), the River Patrol Force (TF 116), and the Mobile Riverine Force
(TF 117), conducting brown- and green-water operations and counterinsur-
gency missions along the coasts of South Vietnam.5 These are just a few exam-
ples, taken from the long history of irregular warfare in the U.S. Navy.
In January 2010 the Chief of Naval Operations released “The U.S. Navy’s Vi-
sion for Confronting Irregular Challenges.”6 The document recognizes the need
to “define the strategic and operational tenets and approaches for our navy to
apply across our general purpose and special operation forces.” These tenets and
approaches must be founded in the historical lessons of over two centuries of ir-
regular U.S. naval operations. The current counterinsurgency doctrine devel-
oped jointly by the Army and Marine Corps takes great pains to study and
embrace the history of the mission.7 As the Navy comes to terms with its role in
modern, asymmetric conflict, it too will return to its past.
In early 1804 the United States found itself embroiled in the first foreign test
of American power and resolve, a test that it was failing. After a single irregular-
warfare mission, however, everything changed. A bold raid led by Lieutenant
Stephen Decatur against Tripoli harbor to burn the captured frigate USS Phila-
delphia changed the direction of the conflict and raised American prestige
throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. Admiral Horatio Nelson, who was
in command of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean at the time, called the at-
tack “the most daring act of the age.” This example of early American irregular
warfare can suggest important principles for the twenty-first century as the
Navy looks to redevelop its ability to conduct asymmetric missions.
DISAPPOINTMENTS AND DEBACLES
It did not take long after gaining its independence for the United States to be-
come involved in its first overseas conflict. At the turn of the nineteenth century
the northern coast of Africa—the Barbary Coast, as it was known—was made
up of the sultanate of Morocco and the regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli,
all of which owed allegiance in one form or another to the Ottoman Empire.
These tributaries, for the most part autonomous, were the homes of a developed
culture of piracy and slave trade that stretched as far back as the fall of the Ro-
man Empire. During the eighteenth century over 150,000 European Christians
had been captured into slavery or held for ransom by the Barbary powers. By the
time of the American Revolution a well established system of tribute was in exis-
tence by which the trading nations of Europe paid “tribute,” protection money,
to the Barbary rulers in exchange for the safety of their merchant ships. The cor-
sairs of the Barbary Coast, entrepreneurial men of the sea, recognized that now
that the United States was free from Great Britain, American merchant ships no
longer fell under the protection of the Royal Navy or the tribute paid by the
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British Crown. Mediterranean raiders from the Ottoman tributaries of North
Africa fell upon the extensive American merchant trade that passed near their
shores, taking ships and cargo as booty and sailors for ransom.8
In May 1801, the pasha of Tripoli made it official when, after demanding over
two hundred thousand dollars in tribute, he declared war on the United States of
America. In response President Thomas Jefferson sent a series of naval squad-
rons to the Mediterranean to protect American merchant shipping. The first de-
ployment, which began in 1801 under Commodore Richard Dale, was marked
by frustration and failure. The force, termed a “Peace Establishment,” operated
under strict rules of engagement. American warships were allowed to intervene
only when they directly witnessed an attack on an American merchant by a cor-
sair.9 The primary success of the squadron came at Gibraltar, where it discovered
Tripoli’s naval commander anchored there with two vessels. Dale ordered Cap-
tain Samuel Baron to lie off the harbor with USS Philadelphia, bottling up the
small Tripolitan force. The corsairs eventually gave up waiting for Philadelphia
to leave, dismantled their ships, and discharged their crews.10 Meanwhile, Dale
dispersed his three other ships across the Mediterranean, where they conducted
convoys and cruised singly for corsairs. In the end they had little to show.
A second mission left Hampton Roads in 1802, under the command of Com-
modore Richard Morris. Although the president and Congress had relaxed the
rules of engagement, “Morris’ squadron behaved more like a touring company
than a naval force.”11 Morris brought his wife along for the trip and spent plenty
of time ashore with family. William Eaton, the American consul at Tunis (who
would in 1805 lead the American attack on Derna), asked in a letter, “What have
they [the squadron’s crews] done but dance and wench?”12 Morris’s deployment
was even less successful operationally than Dale’s, despite having more ships and
its more aggressive rules of engagement. This inactivity and reports of the
squadron’s behavior that reached Washington resulted in Morris’s relief and of-
ficial censure. In 1803 Commodore Edward Preble was dispatched to the Medi-
terranean with a third American squadron.13
The first great challenge that Preble encountered was the capture by
Tripolitan forces of the forty-four-gun frigate Philadelphia under Captain Wil-
liam Bainbridge while negotiating with the Moroccans. In November 1803
Bainbridge had spotted a coastal raiding craft “very near the shore” running to-
ward the harbor of Tripoli.14 Philadelphia gave chase, and the vessel hoisted
Tripolitan colors. Bainbridge ran in as close to shore as he felt comfortable, care-
fully checking his charts, which indicated forty-two feet of water beneath his
keel. As the Tripolitan ship neared the entrance to the harbor Philadelphia was
obliged to bear off the wind, allowing the Tripolitan to escape, and ran aground
on unmarked rocks in twelve feet of water.15
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The Americans were unable to refloat the ship, even after casting the ballast
and the majority of the guns overboard and cutting away the foremast. Gun-
boats sailed from Tripoli harbor and began to shell the grounded ship. Accord-
ing to the ship’s officers, “every exertion was made, and every expedient tried, to
get her off and defend her.”16 Nonetheless, fearing for the safety of his crew as the
enemy shells began to gain accuracy, Bainbridge surrendered his command to
the Tripolitans. Local knowledge of the tides and currents allowed the enemy to
float the ship and carry its prize and three hundred prisoners into Tripoli.17
Preble was faced with a difficult situation. The international prestige of the
United States, and the Navy in particular, plummeted after the capture of Phila-
delphia. After the bumbling of the first two squadrons, American naval leader-
ship appeared at best foolish, at worst incompetent. Preble was faced with two
choices: either to mount an invasion of the city of Tripoli to retake Philadelphia
and free Bainbridge and the prisoners or to develop a plan to destroy the frigate
at its mooring in Tripoli harbor.
Reports indicated that Philadelphia lay deep in the harbor, “within pistol shot
of the whole of the Tripolitan marine, mounting altogether upward of one hun-
dred pieces of heavy cannon, and within the immediate protection of formida-
ble land batteries, consisting of one hundred and fifteen pieces of heavy
artillery.”18 In the harbor a mixed fleet of nineteen gunboats, two schooners, two
galleys, and a brig, with over a thousand Tripolitan sailors, lay at anchor or were
moored to the quay. It was also estimated that the guns of the harbor fortress
were supported by twenty-five thousand troops encamped in the city. Preble’s
squadron at the time was made up of only seven ships and eight gunboats. In-
cluding the small detachments of U.S. Marines on board he could muster a total
of 1,060 men.19 Preble realized that there was little chance of success in mount-
ing an invasion of the pasha’s regency with the forces he had at his disposal.
A BOLD YOUNG OFFICER
The solution to the capture of Philadelphia came in the form of irregular war-
fare. Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, in command of the fourteen-gun schooner
USS Enterprise, had recently captured a small Tripolitan ketch, Mastico. Origi-
nally built as a bomb ketch for Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt, the small ves-
sel had been purchased by Tripolitan merchants and converted to a commercial
vessel; now, it easily blended with local craft.20 Its capture was still recent and
likely to be unknown in Tripoli’s harbor. Decatur saw an opportunity.
The young lieutenant approached the commodore in the squadron’s Sicilian
base at Syracuse, where the flagship, USS Constitution, and Enterprise were both
in port. Sending the American squadron in close enough to ensure the Philadel-
phia’s destruction by bombardment would place its ships in too great a danger
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from the massed enemy guns. Nor did the Americans have enough force for a
full assault on the city. Decatur suggested that, with men from Enterprise as crew,
the captured ketch could slip into Tripoli’s harbor, then board and recapture
Philadelphia.21 Once he was in control of Philadelphia the lieutenant intended to
sail it clear of the harbor and back into the service of the United States.
Preble considered the plan of the promising young officer and realized that it
just might work. On 31 January 1804 the commodore renamed the captured
ketch Intrepid and ordered Decatur to take command of an expedition against
Tripoli harbor. Decatur was authorized to load stores for thirty days and draw a
crew of seventy-five sailors and Marines. Preble instructed Decatur to take only
volunteers, for the mission would be dangerous; he sent him five midshipmen
from Constitution, as well as the flagship’s Italian pilot. He also ordered the brig
USS Syren, sixteen guns, commanded by Lieutenant Charles Stewart, to accom-
pany Decatur and provide support as required. The commodore was clear in the
purpose of the mission: he wanted Philadelphia destroyed—not recovered, as
Decatur had proposed. His formal orders to Decatur stated, “The destruction of
the Philadelphia is an object of great importance”; they gave strict instructions
that “after the ship is well on fire, [Decatur was to] point two of the eighteen-
pounders, shotted, down the main hatch, and blow her bottom out.”22 Attempt-
ing to sail the frigate clear of the harbor would pose too great a risk to his men,
no matter how gallantly they were led.
Decatur took two days to load the stores, weapons, and explosives before In-
trepid set sail in the company of Syren. The sixty-ton bomb ketch, designed as a
coaster and generally unfit for long, blue-water voyages, had a difficult
250-nautical-mile crossing. Also, the men aboard Intrepid discovered, after
they were under way, that many of the stores they had been issued were putrid
and unusable. On 7 February, as they approached the North African coast, a
gale struck the two American ships; Intrepid’s small size and poor construction
nearly doomed the expedition. They survived the storm and the poor provi-
sions, but word now spread that the force might have been discovered. The
confidence of the men was severely tested. Lewis Heermann, a Navy surgeon
asked by Decatur to join the mission, wrote later that among the men these
challenges “laid the foundation of apprehensions of eventual failure.”23
A DARING ATTACK
On 16 February, under a noonday sun, Intrepid approached within sight of Trip-
oli harbor. The weather had improved following the gale, but the horizon did
not look promising and the crew suspected a second storm was coming. Decatur
called a council of his officers to discuss their situation: dwindling stores, poor
weather approaching, and a crew that was beginning to lose morale. They came
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to the conclusion that they could not wait for Syren, which had separated from
Intrepid after the storm and agreed to meet later that evening with boats to help
screen Intrepid’s retreat after the mission. The winds were favorable for both a
smooth entry into and exit from the harbor, and the storm clouds appeared to be
a day off. Decatur ordered his crew to clear the decks and make ready for battle.
The men concealed themselves, mostly below, and at nightfall Intrepid made
its approach into the harbor. Salvatore Catalano, the Italian pilot sent by Preble,
had sailed the Mediterranean for decades and knew the harbor well. He guided
the ketch through the anchored ships, the relatively massive hull of Philadelphia
easily visible in the lights of the city. As Intrepid approached the frigate a sentry
called out; Catalano called back in a local language, a Mediterranean sailor’s pa-
tois of mixed dialects, and talked the vessel alongside. Intrepid made fast to Phil-
adelphia, and the Americans struck.
The boarding party, made up of sixty sailors and Marines, poured from below
decks and scaled the side of the frigate. Midshipman Richard Morris, who would
later command USS Adams in the War of 1812 and be promoted to commodore,
was the first to reach Philadelphia’s deck, “in a spirit of gallant emulation,” fol-
lowed closely by Midshipman Thomas MacDonough, who was to be the hero of
the battle of Lake Champlain.24 The Americans fell upon the Tripolitan guards
with swords and knives, under strict orders from Decatur not to use firearms, for
fear of alerting the rest of the harbor. The attack went like clockwork, as each of
the men went rapidly about his assigned task. Twenty guards were killed, and
one was taken prisoner; the men then began setting up the combustibles. Several
Tripolitans, however, had escaped in a boat that was moored on the opposite side
from Intrepid or had jumped overboard; the alarm went out across the harbor,
and the fortress opened fire.25
Catalano glanced around the harbor. The winds continued to favor their es-
cape; the tides, current, and layout of the harbor were better than he had antici-
pated. He found Decatur and explained that they might be able to bring the
frigate safely out of the harbor after all, even without its foremast and with only a
skeleton crew. The lieutenant, however, had his orders.26 Philadelphia—which
his father, Captain Stephen Decatur, Sr., had commissioned in 1801—had to be
destroyed.
Decatur ordered fires set in the storerooms, gun room, cockpit, and berth
deck. The lieutenant ordered the men back aboard Intrepid as cannon shot from
the fortress flew overhead. The rapidly spreading flames poured from the
hatches and ports as Decatur himself crossed back to the ketch. When he cast off,
the fire had begun to climb the frigate’s rigging. Under Catalano’s guidance In-
trepid began to make its way to the channel, firing its four guns and muskets.
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As Intrepid cleared the harbor it was joined by Syren’s boats, which had fol-
lowed orders despite Intrepid’s earlier than expected attack and now covered the
escape. Philadelphia, engulfed in flames and its cable burned through, drifted
through the harbor, finally coming to rest against the fortress.27 In the confusion
there was little attempt to chase the escaping Americans. Syren’s men aug-
mented the crew of Intrepid and transferred fresh stores as a gale began to close
in. Together the American ships weathered the storm and began the long transit
back to Syracuse.
NAVAL IRREGULAR WARFARE
Alfred Thayer Mahan taught naval officers that “the study of history lies at the
foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”28 While Decatur’s
daring attack on Tripoli harbor cannot be exactly duplicated in modern naval
operations, there are principles of naval irregular warfare that can be derived
from the episode. As the Navy attempts to move forward with its “vision for con-
fronting irregular challenges,” it is important that historical principles become
part of the discussion. Important as they could be to the success of future opera-
tions, however, these historical principles should not be considered rules or
equations that will guarantee successful results. Principles determined from his-
tory are, as Mahan suggested, “not so much fetters, or bars, which compel [our]
movements aright, as guides which warn when [we are] going wrong.”29
It has been suggested that Decatur’s raid can be seen as the Navy’s first “spe-
cial operation.” This is not the case according to today’s doctrine, which defines
special operations and special warfare as “operations conducted by specially or-
ganized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve mili-
tary, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional
military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.”30 While the mis-
sion was certainly unconventional and aimed to achieve a military objective in a
hostile area, it was not carried out by a “specially organized, trained, and
equipped” force. The crew of Intrepid was made up of volunteers hastily gath-
ered from other American naval vessels. They brought with them standard
training in early nineteenth-century naval warfare and had no specially de-
signed equipment. The mission, then, is best classified as “irregular warfare”
rather than an example of “special operations.”
The strike against Philadelphia can be described as a “cutting-out expedi-
tion.” These missions were not uncommon in the age of sail, and numerous ex-
amples can be drawn from American naval history. In 1778 Captain John Paul
Jones, commanding USS Ranger, attempted to capture HMS Drake while at an-
chor in the roads at Carrickfergus, Ireland.31 In 1812 Lieutenant Jesse Elliot
would cut out the brigs Detroit and Caledonia in one of the first naval operations
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on the Great Lakes during the War of 1812.32 These missions were not tradi-
tional, open-water ship duels or squadron engagements. However, they were
conducted by what today would be called a “general-purpose force,” making
them perfect examples of irregular warfare in the early American period.
The first principle of naval irregular warfare that is demonstrated by
Decatur’s raid emerges from the fact that Intrepid’s expedition was part of a con-
ventional operation and was directly supported by regular naval forces. The
Tripolitan corsairs refused squadron-level engagements and frequently ran
from single-ship battles as well. The American squadron in the Mediterranean
had established local command of the sea.33 Decatur’s chances of success were
much higher because of the local dominance established by Preble’s conven-
tional naval forces.
More directly, without the assistance of USS Syren the mission would likely
have failed. Most of the combustibles used to burn Philadelphia were prepared
aboard Syren and transferred to Intrepid for the attack.34 The larger warship
stood by to provide protection during Intrepid’s escape and support during the
storms that they soon encountered. Commodore Preble wrote in his reports that
Syren had been vital to the success and that Lieutenant Stewart’s “conduct
through the expedition has been judicious and highly meritorious.”35
Naval irregular warfare, then, while it can be carried out by special operations
forces, is an appropriate and important mission for conventional naval forces. It
requires fleet support, but at the same time it directly contributes to the fleet’s
mission.
When applying this principle to modern naval affairs it is important to high-
light the balance required. A fleet must be able to achieve and maintain com-
mand of the sea. However, it is just as important to be able to use that command
once achieved—for, among other vital purposes, irregular warfare. As Sir Julian
Corbett pointed out in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, naval forces are key
elements of limited wars, which commonly require irregular capabilities.36 The
U.S. Navy has worked to expand its irregular-warfare capability, forming for that
purpose the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). But some mem-
bers of the Navy seem to believe that this simple organizational act is “the an-
swer”—that irregular warfare can simply be left to forward-deployed sailors
from NECC. Its personnel, in fact, often feel cut off from the greater Navy.
NECC cannot do it alone; the support, and even conduct, of naval irregular war-
fare by the general-purpose force is critical to “leveraging the maritime do-
main.”37 Rear Admiral Phillip Greene, the director of the Navy Irregular Warfare
Office, has written in an “op-ed” piece on the website Defense News, “What is of-
ten described as irregular warfare is actually part of the regular mission set for
the Navy.”38
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The type of ship used in the attack points to a second principle of naval irreg-
ular warfare. Mastico, as Intrepid had been named prior to its capture, was main-
tained according to what today are called “commercial standards,” for merchant
service along the coastal littorals and shallows of North Africa. While armed, it
did not carry the heavy armament of a warship; neither did it have the heavy dis-
placement or deep draft that would have limited its ability to escape from Tripoli
harbor. The grounding of Philadelphia demonstrated the risks of using large
warships, designed for fleet engagement, in the littorals.
Intrepid had its own limitations. Its construction quality and its design as a
coaster created risk when it crossed the open Mediterranean during storm sea-
son. Twice storms nearly swamped it. Intrepid’s light armament required the
commodore to send Syren for fire support. Vessels designed to operate close to
shore or that offer amphibious capability are vital to irregular warfare but are
risky to use for traditional open-water missions or in the line of battle; they must
be used judiciously.
“The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges” calls for new
platforms and systems, and in turn a reallocation of resources, to conduct irreg-
ular warfare properly.39 There appears to be a willingness to make the required
changes to acquisitions plans. Changes that merit more study and possibly some
form of implementation, if the Navy takes irregular warfare seriously, might be
along the lines of “Influence Squadrons” or the “New Navy Fighting Machine.”40
Also, the Navy frequently highlights the multimission capabilities of the Arleigh
Burke–class guided-missile destroyer (DDG), arguing that the vessels could
serve the fleet’s irregular-warfare requirement.41 At the dawn of the nineteenth
century too the U.S. Navy had a large, multimission vessel that was technologi-
cally advanced and the envy of other nations—Joshua Humphreys’s “fast frig-
ates.”42 However, USS Philadelphia was one of those frigates; Decatur’s raid was
necessary because large, multimission combatants are not always the answer for
fighting in the littorals. The new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a start, a recogni-
tion that equipment and shipbuilding are important to meeting irregular-
warfare challenges, but not the end.
A third principle of naval irregular warfare is that a particular quality of lead-
ership is needed—“empowered” and aggressive junior officers. Stephen Decatur
was one of several rising lieutenants whom senior officers and government offi-
cials considered as the “young officers” who would perpetuate “the glory and
triumphs of the American flag.”43 Less than five years prior to the burning of
Philadelphia he had been promoted from midshipman. He had been in com-
mand of small vessels for less than two years when he approached Commodore
Preble with his plan. That is, Stephen Decatur had nothing to lose by suggesting
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this irregular mission—he was years away from consideration for further pro-
motion that might have been jeopardized by a failure.
Junior officers have frequently been sources of innovation and creativity, but
today there is a temptation, due to modern communications and information
technology, for senior commanders to take larger roles at the tactical level. P. W.
Singer has written about the “rise of the tactical general,” warning of its negative
impact on initiative and effectiveness.44 Due to the very nature of irregular mis-
sions—dispersed but part of a larger plan—it is vital that creative problem solv-
ing and leadership among junior officers be encouraged and rewarded. Whether
the leader of a boarding team off the coast of the Somalia or a helicopter aircraft
commander conducting counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean, tactical
leaders’ actions can have strategic effects in so-called hybrid conflicts. If these
“strategic junior officers” are micromanaged, they will lose initiative, and the ef-
fectiveness of irregular warfare will suffer.
Besides the temptation of modern technology to micromanagement, the di-
rection of force structure and shipbuilding also appears to be limiting the devel-
opment of daring and capable junior officers. The intention to replace the
Navy’s patrol craft and minesweepers with the LCS has removed the last oppor-
tunity for command at sea for lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. The LCS,
deemed too valuable to entrust to such inexperienced officers, will be assigned
to officers in the grade of commander. Generations of senior naval officers have
learned to balance aggressive leadership and risk from their experience in com-
mand of small ships—not just Stephen Decatur but also Chester Nimitz and the
current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen.45 At a
time when some serving and retired officers feel that the Navy’s leadership cul-
ture is taking risk-aversion to an extreme, daring and creative junior officers are
unlikely to survive failure or to be rewarded for success.46
A fourth and final principle of naval irregular warfare is that local and cul-
tural knowledge, whether from members of the U.S. Navy or through local part-
nership, is vital for the success of missions like Decatur’s raid. Without Salvatore
Catalano and his knowledge of the local customs and language, it would have
been nearly impossible for Intrepid to get alongside Philadelphia without raising
an alarm first. Catalano was a Sicilian merchant seaman, a native of Palermo,
who had worked the routes between Tripoli and Malta for over a decade.47 His
firsthand knowledge of the tricky shoals and shallows of Tripoli harbor was cou-
pled with his mastery of the local maritime dialect, a mix of Arabic, Berber, and
other Mediterranean languages. He had served as a pilot aboard Constitution
and Enterprise, with the blessing of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. During the
Barbary Wars the cooperation of the Sicilians and the British at Gibraltar and
Malta represented key partnerships for the Americans, providing not only
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secure supply bases but also gunboats that would be used in Commodore
Preble’s attack on Tripoli later in 1804.48
Today the employment of local sailors like Catalano offers an option, one
that underlines the importance of maintaining theater-security relationships
around the globe. Partnership with local forces can produce the knowledge
necessary for success. A second source of this important knowledge is cultural
expertise from the U.S. military’s intelligence and foreign-area-officer com-
munities. These specialists are growing in numbers and are vital to the plan-
ning and execution of irregular missions. These communities must continue
to grow in order to support ships that are headed to theaters where irregular
missions can be expected. Irregular-warfare missions are frequently joint af-
fairs as well, as seen in the early demonstration of the “Navy–Marine Corps
team” in Decatur’s raid. While there may be no naval unit with the specializa-
tion or local knowledge required for a particular mission, experts from the
other services or interagency resources may be able to provide them.
NAVAL IRREGULAR WARFARE: PAST AND PRESENT
When the Chief of Naval Operations released “The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Con-
fronting Irregular Challenges” he called on the service to identify and develop
the doctrine, tactics, and equipment required to face the asymmetric challenges
of the twenty-first century. An examination of America’s naval past provides nu-
merous examples of naval irregular warfare. American naval strategy prior to
the Spanish-American War was not based on the decisive fleet engagement but
on gunboat diplomacy, blockade, commerce raiding, riverine campaigns, and
amphibious warfare. In the twenty-first-century context of naval power, much
of America’s early naval heritage would be considered irregular warfare or a hy-
brid of irregular and conventional campaigns.
In order to develop modern irregular-warfare strategies and operations suc-
cessfully, the U.S. Navy needs to look to the past. The First Barbary War demon-
strates four important principles for success in irregular warfare. It must be part
of a greater naval strategy and be supported by regular forces. Vessels must be
suited to the littoral environment, where these missions commonly occur. Lead-
ership at a low level in the chain of command will ensure that missions do not
become encumbered with oversight that can disrupt the effectiveness of the unit
on scene. Finally, local cultural knowledge or partnership will help ensure that
the specific expertise required for mission accomplishment is available. By re-
membering these principles as it plans for irregular-warfare missions and cam-
paigns, the U.S. Navy will be better prepared to engage in the asymmetric and
hybrid conflicts of the twenty-first century.
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